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667 
Queer Phenomenology in Law: A Critical 
Theory of Orientation 
 





This Article argues for the application of phenomenology to 
legal understanding, specifically as a way to think about and 
through queer people’s interactions with law as well as queer 
theory in law.  There are both pragmatic and theoretical 
justifications for this project.  The pragmatic justifications 
include the need to better address the legal issues and 
experiences of queer people, recent political and legal decisions 
and debates that affect queer people specifically, the need to 
better provide epistemological resources for queer lawyers, law 
scholars, law students, and their allies, and the need to better 
understand how law affects minoritarian populations regardless 
of specific identity characteristics.  The theoretical justifications 
include the relative under-theorization of queer theory in law, 
the improvement of legal theory’s interaction with related 
theories in the humanities and social sciences, and the 
development of a more robust theory of everyday interactions 
with law consistent with individuals’ diverse experiences and 
identities.  These justifications counsel for further study and 
attempts to account for diversity in law. 
The first part of this Article1 discusses phenomenology 
historically and theoretically, applying the insights of important 
continental philosophy scholars as well as modern day theorists 
from law, communication, women’s studies, cultural studies, 
 
* Assistant Professor of Communications, Texas A&M University-Kingsville.  
Postgraduate Certificate, University of Central Florida; Ph.D., Georgia State 
University; J.D., West Virginia University College of Law; M.S., Troy 
University; B.A., University of Richmond.  A shorter version of this Article was 
presented at a talk at Southern Illinois University School of Law on April 12, 
2018 sponsored by SIU Law OUTLaw.  Thanks to Erin Hogdson (Southern 
Illinois University School of Law, Class of 2020) who made that talk possible. 
1.  See infra notes 6–52. 
1
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queer studies, and related disciplines. 
The second part of this Article2 discusses Sara Ahmed’s 
theories of orientation and disorientation.  Firmly rooted in the 
writings of Edmund Husserl, Ahmed’s theories are a way to both 
think about political possibility and the ways in which rights, 
identity, and action are all inhibited and empowered by 
disorientation.  While scholars in many disciplines have applied 
these ideas to everything from academia to law, and 
communication to gender studies, legal scholarship on these 
ideas has been slim.  This section considers (dis)orientation an 
everyday event impacted at every turn, from using the bathroom 
to appearing in court. 
The third part of this Article3 discusses the difficulties of 
orientation and disorientation in law specifically.  Although law 
is only one part of the broader social milieu, it affects us in 
seemingly innumerable ways.  This section discusses the way 
law inhibits and enables various orientations and offers fruitful 
paths to (re)orient oneself in law. 
The fourth part of this Article4 proposes Sara Ahmed’s 
theory of hammering as a strategy for challenging 
heteronormative legal theory and practice as well as, by 
extension, other normative practices that can limit participation 
and advancement of minoritarians in law and society.  
Hammering’s applicability to issues complex (court cases, social 
movements, etc.) and less so (colleagues’ inappropriate language 
use, general confusion about queerness, etc.) makes it a fruitful 
praxis for challenging oppressive systems in law and elsewhere. 
The conclusion5 emphasizes the importance of the body as a 
site of theorizing law.  Absent the body, law risks material harm 
not only to queer people, but to other minoritarians who may be 
commodified and objectified through both overt discrimination 
as well as more subtle forms of ignoring and misperceiving.  
Without the body, law fails to inform a functioning society and 
assure protection for people under its jurisdiction. 
 
 
2.  See infra notes 53–68. 
3.  See infra notes 69–97. 
4.  See infra notes 98–130. 
5.  See infra notes 131–143. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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On Phenomenology 
 
Phenomenology is a not-so-old philosophical tradition 
concerned with what can be experienced.6  It is concerned not 
only with this ephemeral notion of experience, but also with 
living, knowing, and perceiving.7  Central to phenomenology is 
the idea of indeterminacy, which phenomenology scholars argue 
we must embrace to better understand how we think, act, and 
live in the world.8  As such, phenomenology is uniquely able to 
advance a queer theory of law that centers the complexity of 
gender and sexual orientation in the uniquely orienting world of 
law.  That is, embracing fluidity, difference, and indeterminacy 
are necessary preconditions for a theory of any difference in law 
such that it does not recreate normative preferences for who or 
what is powerful. 
Phenomenology was, in large part, a reaction to the focus on 
metaphysical questions that seemed to err toward the 
ephemeral.9  There was a sense that philosophy failed to 
 
6.  See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY (Lee 
Hardy trans., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1st ed. 1999) (1952). 
7.  Mark P. Orbe, Assessing the Civil Rights Health of Communities: 
Engaged Scholarship Through Dialogue, in 1 COMMUNICATION ACTIVISM 133, 
133, 142 (Lawrence R. Frey & Kevin M. Carragee eds., 2007). 
8.  Silvia Stroller best made this argument when she wrote: “In his 
phenomenology, Husserl introduced a positive conception of what is 
indeterminate in the experience of the world.  This positive conceptualization 
of indeterminacy was more clearly articulated by the French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty who in his Phenomenology of Perception claimed: ‘We 
must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon.’”  Silvia Stroller, 
The Indeterminable Gender: Ethics in Feminist Phenomenology and 
Poststructuralist Feminism, 13 JANUS HEAD, no 1, 2013, at 17, 23 (quoting 
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 7 (Colin Smith 
trans., Routledge Classics 2002) (1945)).  For Merleau-Ponty, this means 
recognizing the indeterminate as indeterminate and not just as the negation 
of something else.  This reorientation is essential.  What Merleau-Ponty calls 
for is a rehabilitation of the indeterminate in our thinking.  “In my opinion this 
rehabilitation of the indeterminate is a challenge we are still facing since it is 
still difficult, personally and philosophically, to allow the indeterminate to 
remain indeterminate and to accept indeterminacy as such.”  Id. 
9.  Emiliano Trizio describes Edmund Husserl’s reaction this way: “We 
have enough elements to draw some conclusions concerning Husserl’s notion 
of metaphysics before the so-called transcendental turn.  Husserl’s thought 
was motivated from the outset by the project of developing a philosophy 
3
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adequately account for people’s  experiences, that is, how they 
experienced philosophy as lived or, put differently, how 
philosophy translated into politics.10  Now, criticisms of 
philosophy and theory courses in the humanities11 as well as of 
the theory courses that are increasingly absent in law school 
curricula are prominent.12  This suggests that phenomenology 
may be a way to incorporate theory into law school in a way that 
supports a material understanding of legal practice. 
Phenomenology benefits law because it blows the dust off of 
the covers of hornbooks, county plat maps, and leather covered 
legal pads.  Law is fundamentally about people—people who 
experience the world in vastly different ways and for whom legal 
systems often poorly guarantee rights and basic respect.  
Phenomenology asks people to return to the body as a site of 
creation and contestation.  As Sara Ahmed puts it: 
“[P]henomenology attends to the tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic 
[sic] and visual character of embodied reality.”13  It asks us to 
 
corresponding to the highest ambitions of the European tradition.  In this 
programmatic framework, metaphysics presents itself as the crowning 
discipline, the one dealing with the fundamental questions concerning the 
totality of the real being of the world and of anything that might lie ‘beyond it.’  
Within this approach, Husserl does not appear to be preoccupied by the 
complex historical evolution of the concept of metaphysics from Aristotle’s 
characterization up to its Kantian and post-Kantian developments. Rather, as 
is typical of his method, he appropriates a motive from the tradition and 
elaborates it in light of the theoretical developments and the resulting 
constraints characterizing his philosophical situation.” Emiliano Trizio, 
Husserl’s Early Concept of Metaphysics as the Ultimate Science of Reality, 
PHAINOMENON Oct. 2017, at 37, 63–64 (2017). 
10.  See Max Horkheimer, The Social Function of Philosophy, RADICAL 
PHIL., WINTER 1972, AT 10, 10–13. 
11.  Id. 
12.  David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-
law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html; see also Jeff Schmitt & 
Tipping The Scales, Here’s How Law School Grads Would Fix Law School, 
FORTUNE (July 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/26/heres-how-law-school-
grads-would-fix-law-school/. See generally, William T. Vukowich, Comment, 
The Lack of Practical Training in Law Schools: Criticisms, Causes and 
Programs for Change, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 140, 140–52 (1971) (arguing for 
more practical training of law students). 
13.  Sara Ahmed, A Phenomenology of Whiteness, 8 FEMINIST THEORY 149, 
153 (2007).  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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measure our philosophical knowledge against the lived world.  
There are several reasons why this portends opportunity for law. 
First, phenomenology orients legal thinkers and 
practitioners toward facts so that they remember why they are 
lawyers, judges, social workers, activists, and scholars.  Facts 
matter in law; they were often a focus in early law school classes.  
Sometimes they seem obscured by theory or the parsing of 
precedent.  Theory should not obscure facts, but rather should 
emphasize them because the material conditions of life demand 
theorization as much as the immaterial.14  This is not to argue 
for a material theorization of law that focuses solely on material 
conditions,15 but rather to argue from a materialist legal theory 
that appreciates the immaterial and material conditions of life 
at once—a materialism where facts matter to law and theory.16 
One of the troubled framings of law that many people take 
up is the ethereal language of rights and liberties,17 denying the 
impact these struggles have for people and preventing an 
application to lives and lived experience.  Grand rights 
discourses often discuss people as afterthoughts.18  It would be 
 
14.  Allison Assiter describes materialism as being fundamentally 
concerned with people’s lives (“Before justifying Marx’s materialism in this 
way I must begin describing it.  The subject material of Marx’s materialist 
conception of history is material life.  What is this?  An answer is: ‘{People], 
their activity, and the material conditions under which they live.’”). Alison 
Assiter, Philosophical Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History, 
RADICAL PHIL. Winter 1979 at 12, 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See 
generally Bertrand Russell, Introduction to FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE, THE 
HISTORY OF MATERIALISM, AND CRITICISM OF ITS PRESENT IMPORTANCE v–xix (3d 
ed. 1925) (1881) (discussing the development of materialism in philosophy with 
an emphasis on the physical sciences). 
15.  Norman Levine, The German Historical School of Law and the 
Origins of Historical Materialism, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 431, 437–45 (1987). 
16.  A project like this would follow the work of Ronald W. Greene’s 
articulation of a materialist-communicative model of rhetorical agency.  
Ronald Walter Greene, Rhetoric and Capitalism: Rhetorical Agency as 
Communicative Labor, 37 PHIL. & RHETORIC 188, 198–203 (2004).  As Greene 
writes, “[a]s such, rhetorical agency, in all its communicative dimensions, is at 
once an instrument, object, and medium for harnessing social cooperation and 
coordination as the life-affirming value of communicative labor.” Id. at 203–04.   
17.  Fernanda Doz Costa, Poverty and Human Rights: From Rhetoric to 
Legal Obligations: A Critical Account of Conceptual Frameworks, 5 SUR - INT’L 
J. HUM. RTS. 81, 81–82 (2008). 
18.  Fernanda Doz Costa describes this as the result of intellectual navel-
5
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theoretically significant if lawmakers increased restrictions on 
gun possession,19 but that in and of itself is not an a priori 
consideration despite vociferous advocacy.  Likewise, arguments 
pushing for increased gun ownership or less restrictions would 
meet the same difficulty no matter how favored they were.  
Rather, it is people’s lives that justify more stringent controls, or 
less stringent according to some.  Gun rights are not 
metonymical20 representations of liberty,21 but rather have the 
 
gazing and bureaucratic machinations: “In today’s world, the human rights 
movement is risking its credibility and moral strength if it fails to take account 
of the suffering of millions of people living in poverty and to name that 
suffering as a human rights violation.  Intellectual obstacles cannot be used as 
an excuse anymore.  The powerful human rights machinery needs to be put to 
the service of those who are still waiting to be invited to the banquet of this 
opulent world.”  Id. at 96. 
19.  Jennifer Agiesta, CNN Poll: Seven in 10 Favor Tighter Gun Laws in 
Wake of Parkland Shooting, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 25, 2018, 3:16 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/25/politics/cnn-poll-gun-control-support-
climbs/index.html; Asma Khalid, NPR Poll: After Parkland, Number of 
Americans Who Want Gun Restrictions Grows, NPR (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM),  
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/02/589849342/npr-poll-after-parkland-number-
of-americans-who-want-gun-restrictions-grows; Danielle Kurtzleben, Poll: 
Majorities of Both Parties Favor Increased Gun Restrictions, NPR (Oct. 13, 
2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557433452/poll-majorities-of-
both-parties-favor-increased-gun-restrictions; Kari Paul, The Vast Majority of 
Young Americans Favor Stricter Gun Control, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 28, 2018, 
9:19 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-vast-majority-of-millenn 
ials-favor-gun-control-2017-10-27. 
20.  Shenli Song, Metaphor and Metonymy—A Tentative Research into 
Modern Cognitive Linguistics, 1 THEORY & PRAC. LANGUAGE STUDS. 68, 69 
(2011) (stating “[m]etonymy is a type of figurative language in which the name 
of one thing is replaced with another commonly associated with it.”). See 
generally Jialing Guan, The Cognitive Nature of Metonymy and Its 
Implications for English Vocabulary Teaching, ENG. LANGUAGE TEACHING, Dec. 
2009, at 179, 179–83 (providing multiple definitions of metonymy). 
21.  John Louis Lucaites and Maurice Charland Explain liberty as 
ideography (written as <Liberty> or [Liberty]) thusly: 
 
Our theoretical starting point is Michael Calvin McGee’s 
analysis of [liberty] in the Whig/liberal ideology.  According 
to McGee, [liberty] is not a thing, but an “ideograph,” a term 
or sign that must be used by public officials as a warrant for 
the uses of state power within Whig/liberal societies.  More 
to the point, McGee claims that as a necessary commitment 
to community, [liberty] lacks any fixed meaning. Rather, he 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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very real effect of deciding who can own and use guns,22 which 
then impacts the protection of law.  The protection of lives is an 
a priori consideration.23  One does not need a set of warrants to 
arrive at this conclusion, one just knows it to be true.  Opponents 
of gun control will utter the phrase gun control at a rate far 
greater than they will utter the phrase protect people’s lives 
because the regulation or law ultimately is more important than 
people’s lives due to some abstract notion of a posteriori 
knowledge about rights discourse.24  The problem with a 
posteriori claims is that we assume they are a priori without 
 
suggests that at particular historical moments, those seeking 
to exercise power in the name of the state deploy the 
community’s generalized commitment to [liberty] as an 
argumentative warrant for their actions, and then justify 
their use of the term on the basis of a proffered interpretation 
of the community’s collective tradition.  Political practice is 
thus based in a public, rhetorical production of history and 
tradition that seeks to appropriate [liberty] to one’s ends. 
 
John Louis Lucaites & Maurice Charland, The Legacy of [Liberty]: Rhetoric, 
Ideology, and Aesthetics in the Postmodern Condition, 13 CANADIAN J. POL. & 
SOC. THEORY 31, 33 (1989). 
22.  For an explanation of a materialist account of gun ownership, see 
SimilarFreedom _, A Leftist Defense of Gun Ownership: Dialectical Materialist 
Edition, MEDIUM (Mar. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@similarfree dom/a-
leftist-defense-of-gun-ownership-dialectical-materialist-edition-
bfa0d9a89d23. 
23.  Without going through an extensive discussion of a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge, I take a priori knowledge to be that knowledge which can 
be known without experience.  It seems, then, that one need not have 
experienced people to know that their lives matter.  One might conclude that 
absent interactions with people, one would not develop the necessary social 
bonds needed to regard another’s life as worth saving, yet it seems that when 
one understands that one is human, relying on the necessary language to 
express a priori knowledge, because such understanding of language does not 
destroy a claim that knowledge is a priori.  See Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and A 
Posteriori, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/ 
(last visited February 11, 2019); Bruce Russell, A Priori, STANFORD ENCYC. 
PHILOSOPHY 
 (May 19, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/. 
24.  For an excellent discussion of the memes of gun control, specifically 
those used by the political right, see Kelly McParland, Gun Control Shouldn’t 
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investigating the a priori knowledge that underlies them. 
Second, phenomenology places the people affected by legal 
decisions at its center.  It asks scholars and practitioners to be 
people and think as people.  Gone are the ideas of serving a 
profession or serving the law, which are of course well-
intentioned, but insert the vagaries of philosophy into the 
miasma of people’s lives.  This allows scholars to reason up from 
people rather than reason down from the law’s totality.  That 
offers opportunity for a people-centered jurisprudence that 
underlies many of the critical projects law has to offer. 
Third, phenomenology reminds us that, despite the 
memorization of rules for legal reasoning and writing, what legal 
professionals work toward is people, not even just clients, but a 
much broader array of people present and not in courtrooms and 
legal offices.  Law affects much more than the litigants of a 
specific case.  Here, it seems phenomenology is uniquely 
positioned to do the work that Kwame Anthony Appiah has done 
about difference.25  He writes in his book, Cosmopolitanism, that 
we no longer live in a world of strangers, but are now rather 
neighbors to more people than our ancestors could ever have 
imagined.26  The ease of travel and access to technology, for some 
of us, orients us toward so many people that we need an ethical 
stance which takes difference into account.27  For Appiah, that 
is cosmopolitanism; it is structured by a profound sense of 
 
25.  Appiah argues that we should let people be if their practices uphold 
basic human dignity:  
 
        A liberal cosmopolitanism of the sort I am defending 
might put its point like this: we value the variety of human 
forms of social and cultural life; we do not want everybody to 
become part of a homogeneous global culture; and we know 
that this means that there will be local differences (both 
within and between states) in moral climate as well. As long 
as these differences meet certain general ethical constraints-
—as long, in particular, as political institutions respect basic 
human rights—we are happy to let them be. 
 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 621 
(1997).  
26.  KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF 
STRANGERS xvi–xvii, 94–99 (2006). 
27.  Id. at 72–81. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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people’s importance—of their lived experiences.28  So, 
phenomenology helps legal practitioners and scholars in a world 
of difference, a world queer theory certainly understands, by 
valuing people, their stories, their experiences, and the way they 
all come to the law29 with different backgrounds.  Because if 
lawyers, judges, activists, and the rest of the legal dispositif30 
are going to make law not only supportive of the rule of law,31 
but responsive to people’s needs as well, then practitioners and 
scholars will have to not only acknowledge, but also embrace 
difference. 
I focus on orientation because orienting oneself is what we 
do on a daily basis.  We orient the car in the driveway so it does 
not hit the garage door, we orient ourselves in bed so as not to 
wake a light sleeping partner, and we orient ourselves to new 
students, new ways of teaching, and new job opportunities.  All 
of these orientations paint a picture of constant motion, of being 
in space, but not in place.  The distinction between space and 
place has significance in legal analysis.  Place defines.  “Where 
were you on the night of the crime?”  “I’ll meet you at my law 
 
28.  Id. at xi–xii. 
29.  Nick J. Sciullo, Conversations with the Law: Irony, Hyperbole, and 
Identity Politics or Sake Pase?  Wyclef Jean, Shottas, and Haitian Jack: A Hip-
Hop Creole Fusion of Rhetorical Resistance to the Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
455, 495–96 (2009). 
30.  Michel Foucault writes: 
 
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements 
of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of 
relations that can be established between these elements. 
 
Michel Foucault, The Confession of the Flesh, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED 
INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 194 (Colin Gordon ed., Gordon, 
et al. trans. 1980). 
31.  Hilary Lim, Mapping Equity’s Place: Here Be Dragons, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW 125, 126–27 (Anne 
Bottomley ed., 1996). 
 
9
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office at 9:00 a.m.”  “The clerk’s office is on the second floor of the 
county court building.”  Space describes.  One goes to a baseball 
game because the game is a constructed space of movement, not 
because of the reinforced concrete structure of the stadium itself.  
Dave Matthews writes of “the space between” two people in a 
complex relationship as that great unknowable gap in 
communication that allows us to fail to ever fully describe that 
which we attempt to describe.32  Space appreciates uncertainty 
and angst whereas place seeks to illuminate both. 
This distinction is one that does not readily occur in legal 
analysis.  Occasionally, the dismissive language used to 
condemn critical legal studies as relativistic33 hints at this idea 
of motion, but rarely is there an appreciation for the constant 
change of law and legal teaching.  To be sure, it can be difficult 
to appreciate change in the weeds of teaching.  Likewise, in one’s 
first year of law school, or even during bar review or application 
to another graduate program, it can be difficult to appreciate law 
 
32.  Dave Matthews Band sings:  
 
The space between 
Where you smile and hide 
Is where you’ll find me if I get to go 
The space between 
The bullets in our firefight 
Is where I’ll be hiding, waiting for you 
The rain that falls 
Splashed in your heart 
Ran like sadness down the window into your room 
The space between 
Our wicked lies is 
The hope to keep safe from pain 
 
DAVE MATTHEWS BAND, The Space Between, on EVERYDAY (RCA 2001). 
33.  See Terence Kane, David Brooks: Relativist, or Just a Critical Legal 
Studies Theorist?, HILL (May 29, 2009, 12:14 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs 
/pundits-blog/media/30776-david-brooks-relativist-or-just-a-critical-legal-
studies-theorist.  Robin West summarizes this position: “[R]elativism, 
according to modern objectivists, is politically objectionable in its tendency 
toward ‘quietism’: its pacific acceptance of whatever social structures have 
produced the interests, projects, goals, and ‘personal economies’ on which all 
value is contingent.” Robin L. West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1473, 1476–77 (1990). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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as a spatial phenomenon when it seems to be an orderly 
progression from place to place.  These are competing notions of 
law—law as stable and more or less orderly, and law as radically 
complicated and changing, albeit quite slowly.  It is at that 
shutter, the collapsing of stability, in which we find orientation 
and disorientation. 
From there, practitioners and scholars can theorize what 
their position means in relation to law.  Disorientation can be a 
site of power and repression.34  If one feels disoriented by a legal 
system that continues to misgender people,35 or if people refuse 
to sell things or provide services to someone claiming First 
Amendment protection,36 then disorientation can be quite 
debilitating.  One literally loses the ability to be the person one 
is.  Yet, one might read Sara Ahmed’s work to emphasize the 
productive capacity of disorientation as a time where, despite 
 
34.  Niall Martin & Mireille Rosello, Disorientation: An Introduction, 57 
CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE 1, 3 (2016). 
35.  Sade Kondelin, Dis/Orientations of Gender and Sexuality in 
Transgender Embodiment, 8 SUOMEN QUEER-TUTKIMUKSEN SEURAN LEHTI 32, 
36 (2014) (noting that “[b]eing misgendered, or failing to pass as or to blend in 
with our intended gender, as a continuously repeating experience that it can 
be in the lives of transgender bodies, is easy to perceive as such a crisis”); Kevin 
Allen, Queer Mirror: Transitory Pronoun Disorientation, BEATROUTE (Sept. 9, 
2014, 3:23 PM), http://beatroute.ca/2014/09/09/queer-mirror-transitory-
pronoun-disorientation/ (“Mason explains that it is not the end of the world to 
misgender someone but that people should endeavor to work on their pronoun 
use to not make the same mistakes repeatedly.  ‘For trans people it is not a 
one-off occurrence – they do not get misgendered that one time only – 
eventually there is a cumulative effect,’ he adds.”); CN Lester, On 
Misgendering and Authenticity, A GENTLEMAN AND A SCHOLAR  (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://cnlester.wordpress.com/2013/09/26/on-misgendering-and-authe nticity/ 
(stating “[t]here feels like an assumption that misgendering is far less serious 
when it’s done to someone who isn’t (or isn’t straight forwardly/exclusively) a 
woman or man – that it’s to be expected, that it won’t hurt so much.  Yes, there 
are genderqueer people who aren’t bothered by pronouns/descriptors – but, for 
many of us, it hurts a great deal”); Meg Zulch, 7 Things Genderqueer People 
Want You To Know, BUSTLE (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.bustle.com/articles/124009-7-things-genderqueer-people-want-
you-to-know (Zulch explains: “I am consistently invalidated through 
misgendering, with the constant use of ‘girl,’ ‘woman,’ and ‘miss’ when 
referring to me (even after I correct people).  It’s disorienting, frustrating, and 
often makes me feel invisible”). 
36.   See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018). 
11
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the odds, one can feel the intellectual commitment all the more 
to one’s self and one’s issues, producing affirmation by others in 
the witnessed struggle of one’s life. 
Disorientation happens differently for different people.  Just 
as everything from graduate or law school to the common cold 
affect people in different ways despite being substantially 
similar things, processes, or conditions, disorientation can 
happen differently based on people’s identity markers, social 
mores, legal systems, and many other contextual factors.  For 
these reasons, theorizing disorientation as a discrete process of 
alienation37 from one’s self38 or one’s relations39 would describe 
disorientation in a way that neither appreciates its debilitating 
nor empowering attributes.40 
Orientation is central to the ways we discuss law, the ways 
judges, practitioners, clients, and scholars write and speak 
about it, and the ways we always seem to have a relationship to 
it.41  Law seems to be a prepositional affair.  Under law, this or 
that happens.42  In this way, law seems to be an umbrella of sorts 
 
37.  Ryan C. Parrey, Being Disoriented: Uncertain Encounters with 
Disability, 36 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2016), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/4555 
/4299.  
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Martin & Rosello, supra note 34, at 1–4. 
41.  This relationship is often discussed with specific reference to 
minoritarian populations relationship to law as distinct from whatever might 
be normal in a legal system, which in the United States is often a white, 
Christian, middle-class, cisgendered, moderately educated, able-bodied man.  
These discussions occur across legal practice areas and legal theories.  See 
generally Gordon Christie, Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples, 2 INDIGENOUS 
L. J. 68–115 (2003) (discussing aboriginal peoples’ relationship to law); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal 
Thought of the 1970’s, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9 (1989) (discussing women’s 
relationship to law); Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of 
Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law 
from 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based 
Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207 (2006) (discussing the relationship 
of Black persons to law). 
42.  The use of this preposition in describing a relationship with law dates 
to Antiquity:  
 
Secondly, in the hunt for a better - and more substantial - 
awareness of the “law”, we intend to revisit the different 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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under which one hides to avoid the rain of illegality.  “[A]s an 
accord and satisfaction is grounded in contract law, there must 
be consideration and a meeting of the minds with the intent to 
compromise.”43  This orientation considers law a discrete field 
that is limited by some constructed constraints.  It always 
implies an out.  So, whereas contract law might tell us 
something, if we are outside of contract law, then this 
orientation radically changes what contract law can do for us.  
When we write about the law, instead of law, we assume a 
unified and monolithic structure of law; however, we know that 
legal actors in their fetishistic desire for stability, often 
misrepresent law.  The law is muddled, confusing, consistent in 
its inconsistency, and legal actors are prone to irresponsible, 
unethical, and biased behavior.  Judges let in their personal 
beliefs, and we thankfully have Sonia Sotomayor who finally 
disavowed us of the sophomoric belief that people magically 
 
notions related to the “rule of law”.  Although it is true that 
they are neither equivalent nor unequivocal, they might shed 
some light into our discussion, from the classical distinction 
between the “government of/under men” (“passion”) and the 
“government of/under laws” (“reason”) in Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle, and the principles of “equality before/under law” 
(identified with the Greek word isonomia), or “freedom 
before/under law” in Marcus Tullius Cicero and in Edward 
Coke to the contemporary distinctions between the 
“adjudicative/judicial or legislative rule of law” and the 
“constitutional or institutional rule of law”, including the 
tensions between the ragione di Stato (i.e. reason of State) 
and the Stato della ragione (i.e. State of reason); the 
Machtstaat (i.e. State of power/force) and rechtsstaat (i.e. 
State of law); derecho de Estado (i.e. law of State) and Estado 
de derecho (i.e. State of law or even State-law); and, law’s 
empire - the expression popularized by Ronald Dworkin – or 
even empire of law.  
 
Imer B. Flores, Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional 
Democracy), in LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 77, 78 (Imer B. Flores & 
Kenneth E. Hemma eds., Springer Netherlands 2013). See generally A.B.A., 
Law Day 2015 Magna Carta: Symbol of Freedom Under Law, AM. BAR ASS’N 
DIV. PUB. EDUC., https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public 
_education/LawDay2015/LawDayGuide2015.pdf (using “under law” to 
structure modern legal understanding). 
43.  Emrick v. First Nat’l Bank of Jonesboro, 756 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001) (emphasis added).   
13
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waived away their phenomenological life when they decided or 
argued a case.44  Yes, the use of the definite article implies a 
relationship, a homogeneity, that using the indefinite article or 
the plural does not.  The law, a law, and laws all perform 
different functions and express a set of constraints that 
structure our orientation to law.  Above the law carries with it 
its own set of syntactical orientations.45  If one is above the law 
or acting as though they are above the law, they are orienting 
themselves as more important than law or as though they do not 
have an orientation to law because it does not apply to them, 
which is of course also an orientation. 
The point is that we are always oriented toward law.  We 
are under it, above it, in it, and so on.  So, one’s orientation in 
society is moderated constantly by legal orientation.  This double 
move, or rather complexity of orientation, means people are 
always oriented in law even as they orient without it.  That is, 
one cannot refuse legal orientation.  However, one can act in 
ways that advance an orientation contra law.  Thus, legal 
orientation does not prevent our resistance; rather, it can be a 
source of it.46 
Belgian painter Erik Pevernagie describes the disease in 




44.  Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 
87, 92 (2002) (“Hence, one must accept the proposition that a difference there 
will be by the presence of women and people of color on the bench.  Personal 
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see.”); Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor & Robert A. Stein, The 2016 Stein Lecture: A Conversation 
Between U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Professor Robert 
A. Stein, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2139, 2152–53, 2159–60 (2017). 
45.  Most legal commentators will be familiar with Above the Law, which 
“takes a behind-the-scenes look at the world of law. The site provides news and 
insights about the profession’s most colorful personalities and powerful 
institutions, as well as original commentary on breaking legal developments,” 
quite often reporting on and criticizing those who think they are better than 
the legal system, legal education, professional responsibility, etc.  Breaking 
Media, About, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:37 PM), https:// 
abovethelaw.com/about/. 
46.  See Martin & Rosello, supra note 34, at 7 (noting “[d]isorientation 
equalises, that is, works against hierarchy and perhaps against injustices, be 
they social or physical”). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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We want life to make sense.  If we don’t find 
meaning or orientation, we are bound to fabulate 
a living and invent an inspiring life story.  When 
we write out a chosen script, we’ll have to make 
time to hunker down into attuning it to the 
hitches of the roadmap, time and again, with 
fractious patience.47 
 
For Pevernagie, our quest is to orient or risk the unknowing 
oscillation of disorientation.  The hunkering down to the hitches 
of the road is the important “wake work”48 of queerness.  
Christina Sharpe’s wake work is the necessary self-care of riding 
the wake of the ship for Black folks who must grapple with 
slavery’s haunting.49  Sharpe discusses wake as both a riding of 
the wake in forced diasporic dispersal as well as the wake of 
being with the dead, and the notion of waking up or coming into 
a consciousness.50  Although this wake work is situated in an 
affirmation of Blackness in the face of systemic violence, 
Sharpe’s analysis provides meaningful paths for the furtherance 
of a queer phenomenology.  She centers the experience of slavery 
in Blackness being the same ways the homophobic51 and 
transphobic52 laws of the last several centuries might be 
centered in queerness.  Because queerness is always modified by 
law, not because one cannot be queer, although perhaps modern 
political violence from the current conservative administration 
 
47.  Erik Pevernagie, Everybody His Story, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (2000), 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Everybody_his_story.jpg 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
48.  Mackala Lacy, Wake Work – Self Care for the Black Community, OUT 
OF NOWHERE, (Feb. 18, 2015), https://outofnowhereblog.wordpress.com 
/2015/02/18/wake-work-self-care-for-the-black-community/. 
49.  See generally CHRISTINA SHARPE, IN THE WAKE: ON BLACKNESS AND 
BEING (2016).   
50.  Id. 
51.  See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: 
SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 (2008); DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE 
LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004); Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum Laws, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2017). 
52.  See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People 
Strangers to the Law, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 150, 153–55 (2005). 
15
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might suggest otherwise, law exists in a complex net that we 
have trouble escaping. 
Law is experience.  Rather than imagine queerness as solely 
a theoretical project divorced from material conditions, queer 
theory should be considered a materialist discourse in that it 
connects both high theory and materialism.  It then mirrors 
Sharpe’s wake work because it is historically indebted, 
theoretically rich, and materially oriented.  This then makes 
queerness, queer theory, or queer theorizing ideal for analyzing 
law because law does not exist beyond us, but rather is 
intimately bound up in all we do.  It is something we do and we 
work with and against.  It is our drive to work and our lease.  It 
is what and how we watch and do things.  This understanding 
forces scholars to think about law in the present, instead of 
thinking of law’s immanence.  By considering law in this way, 
scholars only risk improving their interactions with and 
theorizing of minoritarian populations, connecting more 
meaningfully to diverse theoretical perspectives, and orienting 




Edmund Husserl is often considered the founder of 
phenomenological inquiry.53  Phenomenology centered 
experience while eschewing metaphysical commitments.54  This 
 
53.  See generally JAMES M. EDIE, EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY: A 
CRITICAL COMMENTARY (1987) (discussing Husserl’s phenomenology in depth); 
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY (1994) 
(discussing the importance of Husserl to phenomenology and broader relevance 
to continental philosophy). 
54.  One approach to describing the distinct nature of phenomenology 
relative to other foundational philosophical perspectives is:  
 
Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these fields 
is “first philosophy”, the most fundamental discipline, on 
which all philosophy or all knowledge or wisdom rests. 
Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put ethics 
first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then 
Descartes put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, 
and then Husserl (in his later transcendental phase) put 
phenomenology first. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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was an important change in the rather dense and seemingly 
disconnected-from-life philosophy that dominated much 
philosophical work from the Renaissance to Husserl’s time.  
Now, phenomenology often takes the form of evoking personal 
experiences while checking one’s philosophical bags at the door.  
Yet, it is not so much that we cannot discuss metaphysical 
issues, but rather that we must include experience.  The 
inclusion of experience radically reshaped philosophy leading to 
or otherwise informing standpoint theory,55 ethnography,56 and 
autoethnography.57  For Husserl, it was all about the table, a 
 
David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, STANFORD ENCYC. PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 
16, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/; see also Denis 
Seron, Phenomenology in the Present-Day Philosophy, HUSSERL ARCHIVE, 
https://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20Three/Seron.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (“That phenomenology somehow opposes meta 
physics is clear, but this should not mislead us into supposing that it makes all 
metaphysics impossible.”). 
55.  See Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 63, 93–99 (1993). See generally Sandra Harding, Introduction: 
Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific Debate, in 
THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER 1–15 (Sandra Harding ed., 2004) 
(arguing for standpoint theory’s centrality to feminist theory); Susan Hekman, 
Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited, 22 SIGNS: J. WOMEN 
& CULTURE SOC’Y 341, 341–65 (1997) (arguing that writing off standpoint 
theory is a premature conclusion and that standpoint theory addresses 
fundamental questions about women’s experience with and in the world); 
Maksim Kokushkin, Standpoint Theory is Dead, Long Live Standpoint Theory! 
Why Standpoint Thinking Should be Embraced by Scholars Who Do Not 
Identify as Feminists?, J. ARTS & HUMAN., July 2014, at 8, 8–20 (arguing that 
standpoint theory enables new knowledges and focuses on disempowered 
groups). 
56.  See generally Jack Katz & Thomas J. Csordas, Phenomenological 
Ethnography in Sociology and Anthropology, 4 ETHNOGRAPHY 275, 275–88 
(2003) (discussing the relationship between ethnography and phenomenology 
in sociology and anthropology); Alexander Kozin, On Making Legal Emergency: 
Law Office at is Most Expeditious, F. QUALITATIVE SOC. RES., Jan. 2007, at 1, 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/202/ 447 
(discussing the role of ethnography in a law office as informing 
phenomenology); Sarah S. Willen, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of 
“Illegality”: State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among 
Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel, INT’L MIGRATION, July 
2007, at 8, 8–38 (discussing the role of phenomenological ethnography in 
understanding illegal migration). 
57.  Andrew C. Sparkes argues that autoethnographies “are highly 
personalized accounts that draw upon the experience of the author/researcher 
17
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metaphor deeply significant to philosophy. 
This table was central in Husserl’s phenomenology.  This 
metaphor helped explain place and space, the relationship one 
has to both, and also the site of life from eating to work.  The 
table was a point at which phenomenology began.  The table is 
in many ways an interesting choice for Husserl, indebted as he 
was to Karl Marx’s description of the dancing table in Capital, 
Vol. 1.58  For Husserl, the table is both the focal point and anchor 
to orientation.59  His extensive description of the table provides 
much of what one needs to know to appreciate the complexities 
of orientation and its central role in subject creation.  Marx 
described a dancing table, one animated by commodity 
fetishism.  This dancing was of course figurative, but describes 
the world of the commodity when it is infused with exchange 
value, masking over the labor and laborers who made it.  The 
table dances as a commodity as if it were not created as a table.  
Marx describes this table: 
 
The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a 
table is made out of it.  Nevertheless the table 
continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing.  
But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it 
changes into a thing which transcends 
sensuousness.  It not only stands with its feet on 
that ground, but in relation to all other 
commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out 
of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more 
wonderful than if it were to begin dancing on its 




for the purposes of extending sociological understanding.” Andrew C. Sparkes, 
Autoethnography and Narratives of Self: Reflections on Criteria in Action, 17 
SOC. SPORT J. 21, 21 (2000). See generally Sally Denshire, On Auto-
Ethnography, 62 CURRENT SOC. REV. 831 (2014) (discussing some of the 
difficulties in writing about one’s experiences in an autoethnography). 
58.  KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL (Penguin Publ’g Grp. 1992) (1867). 
59.  SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS, 
OTHERS 35–37 (2006). 
60. MARX, supra note 58, at 163–64.  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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This animated table is an expression of orientation—one 
deeply engrained, pun intended, in our relationship to the 
object(ive) world.  Husserl draws on this sense of orientation, the 
relationship of the table to the chain of signifiers that makes up 
capitalism, the relationship between the table and the floor and 
the table to itself, in order to theorize a philosophy of objects, of 
sensory experiences that does not pause to contemplate the table 
dancing, but rather focuses on our relationship to the table.  It 
is this relationship with objects that creates the subject.  Such a 
theory encourages individuals to theorize their own relationship 
to the objects of law (statutes, the Constitution, etc.), the actors 
of law (law enforcement, lawyers, etc.), the producers of law 
(judges, elected officials, etc.), and the process of law (court 
proceedings, legislative processes, etc.).  This would, holistically, 
help individuals better understand and relate to legal systems. 
Husserl brings this to bear on the writing desk.  For many 
legal scholars this will seem familiar—writing as life-affirming 
labor.61  In Ideas I,62 Husserl argues that the writer is oriented 
toward the writing table, but also that one’s experience is that 
such claims naturally arise that one cannot experience.63  We 
may claim that the coffee cup is on the coffee table, yet 
perceptually we cannot perceive what is under the coffee cup.  
Likewise, while the writer is often oriented toward the writing 
table, the writer may in fact only express an orientation toward 
the computer or the piece of paper.  So too might we orient 
ourselves toward the orientation, a second-order orientation so 
that rather than be a writer at a writer’s desk, we might imagine 
ourselves a thinker, an artist, or a theorist.  Orientation plays a 
central role in identity formation and interactions with the 
world. 
Then, to put all of one’s cards on the table carries with it a 
deeper meaning that from Marx through Husserl seems to be 
akin to wearing oneself on one’s sleeve.  The phenomenological 
experience of being becomes intimately tied to one’s relationship 
to the table. 
 
61. See Greene, supra note 16 at 204. 
62. EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE 
PHENOMENOLOGY (W. R. Boyce Gibson trans., Routledge 2012) (1931). 
63.  Wolfgang Huemer, Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution, 137 
SYNTHESE 345–68 (2003). 
19
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Understanding orientation as something so fundamental to 
our being helps explain why the phrase sexual orientation is so 
important.  Quite simply it is about being.  When we think about 
law, then, I would challenge us to think about the queer body.  
To some extent, legal scholars are doing great work on race, 
gender, and religion, but we have yet to bring forth the 
experiences of queer folks with the same intellectual rigor and 
phenomenological passion that we have brought to other 
identities and other critical legal theories.  To be sure, Dean 
Spade64 and Devon Carbado65 have completed much of this work, 
but legal practitioners and scholars still need theories to help 
think through the world as cause and effect of queerness.  Yet, 
they struggle to think about the queer body, both because law 
struggles to come to grips with new understandings of the body 
and because law struggles to understand queerness.  So, then, 
legal scholars, lawyers, and law students are doubly deficient in 
writing, speaking, and thinking about the queer body. 
Queer bodies defy the heteronormative codes of appropriate 
conduct, of what it means to go swimming,66 of what it means to 
 
64.  See generally Dean Spade, Compliance is Gendered: Transgender 
Survival and Social Welfare, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS: HISTORY, POLITICS AND 
LAW 217 (Paisley Currah et. al eds., 2006); Rickke Mananzala & Dean Spade, 
The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & 
SOC. POL’Y 53 (2008); Dean Spade, Introduction: Transgender Issues and the 
Law, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 445 (2010); Dean Spade, Medicaid Policy & 
Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An Interview with Advocates, 
8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497 (2010); Dean Spade & Sel Wahng, Transecting the 
Academy, 10 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUDS. 240 (2004); Dean Spade, Keynote 
Address: Trans Law Reform Strategies, Co-Optation, and the Potential for 
Transformative Change, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288 (2009); Dean Spade: 
Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape, 18 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353 (2009). 
65.  See generally Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil 
Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467 (2000); Devon W. Carbado, Privilege, in BLACK 
QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 190 (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G. 
Henderson eds., 2005); Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 
BERKLEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76 (2000). 
66.  Michelle O’Toole, I Am Scared of Cisgender People: My Time at a 
Transgender Swimming Club, PINK NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:20PM), 
https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/12/22/i-am-scared-of-cisgender-people-my-
time-at-a-transgender-swimming-club/; David Rieder, Transgender 
Swimmers: The Rules for Inclusion and Fairness, SWIMMING WORLD (Dec. 19, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/transgender 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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dress,67 excrete,68 and be.  These codes are of course present in 
courtrooms and law offices, both formally and informally.  They 
exist even when one takes the Bar Exam and must wear 
supposedly gender-specific business clothing.  Of all the skills 
necessary to practice law or think meaningfully about law, 
wearing prescribed professional clothes cannot possibly be one 
of them.  Furthermore, the argument that professional dress 
builds confidence in the profession or academic discipline seems 
to neglect every 1L’s experience of constantly being asked by 
one’s friends and family about the legality of actual and 
hypothetical actions after learning of one’s participation in legal 
education.  That is, once friends become aware of one’s legal 
education, they regularly inquire about legal matters, both 
within the scope of law classes and so far outside of most people’s 
experience in law, and pose questions that even the best-rated 
lawyer in town could not answer without hours of research.  
One’s clothing choice seems not to matter at these times. 
Swimming seems simple enough.  Enjoy a nice day at the 
pool or at the beach.  Swim competitively, for fitness, or just to 
play.  However, swimming is not so simple for transgender 
people, who must rightly critique and are critiqued by people 
with simple assumptions about whether they can swim and 
where.  Bathrooms, changing rooms, and locker rooms all 
become sites of contestation over who counts as a person.  Each 
space, each stall door is an opportunity for new thinking about 
body, relationships, and being.  Swimming becomes not just a 
material repositioning of gendered space, but also a metaphor 
 
-swimmers-the-rules-for-inclusion-and-fairness/. 
67.  See generally CLARE SEARS, ARRESTING DRESS: CROSS-DRESSING, LAW, 
AND FASCINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY SAN FRANCISCO (2014) (arguing 
laws against cross dressing expressed a fascination with behaviors far outside 
typical legal regulation); Morag Curtis & Karen Morris, Cross-Dressing as a 
Meaningful Occupation: A Single Case Study, 78 BRITISH J. OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY 706 (2015) (discussing the role of cross-dressing in identity 
formation). 
68.  See generally Allison Bader, Whose Bathroom Is It, Anyway?: The 
Legal Status of Transgender Bathroom Access Under Federal Employment 
Law, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (2018); Marka B. Fleming & Gwendolyn 
McFadden-Wade, The Legal Implications Under Federal Law When States 
Enact Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom Laws for Students and 
Employees, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 157 (2018); Stephen Rushin & Jenny 
Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2017). 
21
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for movements against the gender current of not so 
postmodernist society. 
Modern workplace dress codes may be changing, but not as 
quickly or as thoroughly as transgender people may like.  What 
counts as acceptable workplace attire still exists in a gendered 
matrix.  Read Internet message boards about the last time a 
heterosexual cisgender female wore a tie to a Hollywood 
opening, and if one digs deep enough into the online comments, 
one is sure to come across heteronormative, vitriolic hate.  Dress 
has long been associated with acceptability.  Baggy jeans, hats, 
ties, dress length, and other clothing markers all signify who a 
person is, reinforcing certain scripts in normative evaluations of 
appropriate dress.  The workplace is no different.  The cool or 
apathetic professor wears sandals or, like one of my law school 
professors, the same tie every day because he is forced to wear a 
tie to teach.  The intern always wears “edgy” outfits.  Casual 
Fridays mean polo shirts or flats.  Obviously, these distinctions 
are arbitrary.  At no point does skirt length mean anything other 
than the wearer has selected that skirt length to wear. 
These issues matter to law because they highlight how 
important the body is, its presentation, and its relationship to 
other bodies and social and professional norms.  Queer and 
transgender people, because of their non-normative status, are 
frequently positioned in difficult situations—always out of place.  
As such, a phenomenological inquiry into law asks that 





Sara Ahmed reminds us, “We learn about worlds when they 
do not accommodate us.  Not being accommodated can be 
pedagogy.”69  So, then, rather than confine our identities in law 
to specific interactions like when one is admitted to law school, 
wins their first CALI award,70 or passes the Bar Exam, what 
 
69.  Sara Ahmed, An Affinity of Hammers, 3 TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 22, 
22 (2016).  
70.  CALI is an acronym for Center for Computer Assisted Legal 
Instruction.  A CALI Award is often given out for the highest grade in a class.  
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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Ahmed suggests is that we learn when we are not accepted.  
Rather than house our knowledge in an intellectual space of 
accommodation and inclusion, hoping that traditional liberalism 
is the cure to our ills, we need a more radical orientation toward 
our disorientation or all those times when we do not fit in or are 
not accommodated.  Such an orientation underscores the 
fundamental inequality at the root of our legal system, a system 
built on indigenous genocide, slavery, police brutality, the denial 
of people’s right to vote, and trans exclusion. 
The operative question in law is: how do we orient ourselves 
in the world given that we are often not the only ones working 
on our orientation?  Compulsory heterosexism structures bodies, 
bodies that “enable some action only insofar as they restrict the 
capacity for other kinds of action.”71  Whatever one’s sexual 
orientation, how one expresses that orientation, or how one 
attempts to orient themselves to the world, orientations can 
restrict action.  Yet, they are also generative; that is, 
orientations can create relationships to others and the world.  
That orientations both serve a restrictive and generative 
function underscores their foundational importance as a site of 
power, and, as well, expresses the need to be responsive about 
the ways in which orientations may be placed on us by legal 
systems, teachers, relatives, and even friends.  It is not that we 
should do away with orientations, but rather that we must be 
mindful of how orientation enables and hinders, empowers and 
disempowers. 
We know, following the work of Michel Foucault72 and 
 
The point is, rather than define oneself by various one-off events, it makes 
more sense to think holistically about one’s identity rather than confine 
identity to a certain grade point average or award. 
71.  AHMED, supra note 59, at 91. 
72.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
32–57 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); see also Maria 
A. Dixon, Transforming Power: Expanding the Inheritance of Michel Foucault 
in Organizational Studies, 20 MGMT. COMM. Q. 283, 289 (2007) (“Foucault 
added the idea that a central conduit for this power is the human network of 
relationships (a basis he subsequently revisited in other conceptions of power) 
in which power is fluid and constantly moving”).  Furthermore, we know that 
this is not simply an esoteric philosophical matter, but rather that the fluidity 
of power affects legal practice.  See, e.g., William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, 
Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client 
23
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Judith Butler,73 to whom Ahmed is much in debt,74 that power is 
fluid, and that being powerful in one instance may produce 
disempowerment in the next.  This is why the work of law is so 
difficult.  In the balance of equitably distributing rights, one 
must move around, squirm, slide, and slip through power space.  
Taking charge of one’s orientation can steady one’s body in 
disorientation, enabling one to better meet the challenges of the 
day and address the day’s challenges. 
Obviously, it can be difficult to do this given the way law 
treats its most vulnerable.  It is dangerous to be queer, and that 
is why so many people struggle to find a position in law.  Yet, 
phenomenology is a self-affirming experience that opens doors 
for being.  Still, one might ask, “Can I be in law, and what does 
that mean for me and others?” 
This question of being rests on the appreciation of the body-
as-such.  That is, the body must be recognized as human and not 
as an object.  Understanding the body-as-such undermines, if not 
ameliorates, the alienating power of law.  The most dramatic 
alienation in law was slavery.75  Slave owners regard Black 
 
Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1497 (1992). 
73.  Much of Judith Butler’s work has revolved around divorcing gender 
from sex and, in turn, describing how gender is fluid.  Judith Butler & Cristan 
Williams, Judith Butler on Gender and the Trans Experience: “One Should Be 




74.  Carolyn Pedwell & Anne Whitehead, Affecting Feminism: Questions 
of Feeling in Feminist Theory, 13 FEMINIST THEORY 115, 116 (2012).  For 
example, comparing quotations from Ahmed, Butler, and Foucault reveals a 
concern with the body, power, identity, and orientation linking the authors.  
Aaron Bady, 7 Days of Queer Theory, NEW INQUIRY (June 25, 2012), https: 
//thenewinquiry.com/blog/7-days-of-queer-theory/. 
75.  Vincent Brown writes: 
 
By making men, women, and children into commodities, 
enslavement destroyed lineages, tethering people to owners 
rather than families, and in this way it “annulled lives, 
transforming men and women into dead matter, and then 
resuscitated them for servitude.”  Admittedly, the enslaved 
“lived and breathed, but they were dead in the social world of 
men.”  As it turns out, this kind of alienation is also part of 
what it presently means to be African American. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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people as not bodies-as-such, but rather as objects.76  This 
commodification, the systematic annihilation of the body as 
subjective in favor of an objective understanding produced the 
disempowering logic that allowed for white slave owners to deny 
Black life, rights, and respect.77  There was no body in this logic 
 
Vincent Brown, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, 114 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1231, 1237–38 (2009).  See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY 
AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 35–76 (1982) (discussing the trauma 
of alienation); Sarah Demetris Turner, African Americans’ Experiences of 
Estrangement and Alienation: A Comparative Analysis of Georg Simmel’s 
Essay “The Stranger” 12–16 (August 2002) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas 
Tech University) (on file with the Texas Tech Library) (discussing the long 
history of African Americans’ alienation in the United States). 
76.  Steven C. Tracy offers the analysis bluntly: “[T]he slave was an object, 
a problem.”  Steven C. Tracy, Introduction: Hughes in Our Time, in A 
HISTORICAL GUIDE TO LANGSTON HUGHES 8 (Steven C. Tracy ed., 2004).  Take 
for example: 
 
[T]he 1926 League of Nations’ definition of slavery as “the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised,” a 
definition which focuses on the master’s ownership of the 
slave and hence implicitly stresses that the slave was an 
object of property. 
 
Ann-Marie Sharon Forgét, The Roman Captive: An Iconographical and 
Cultural Study 19 (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Victoria) (on 
file with the National Library of Canada). 
77.  Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten 
Crime Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 883, 892–93 (2004).  Even if one does not accept the denial of humanity, 
the language games of ascriptive identity put Black humanity in question.  As 
Laurent Dubois argues:  
 
The history of slavery and colonialism constituted the 
term “Black” as the name “of the slave: man-of-metal, man-
merchandise, man-of-money” . . . . The word “designated not 
human beings like all others but rather a distinct humanity—
one whose very humanity was (and still is) in question.”  
Blackness came to “represent difference in its raw 
manifestation—somatic, affective, aesthetic, imaginary.”  
Symbiotically, Whiteness “became the mark of a certain 
mode of Western presence in the world, a certain figure of 
brutality and cruelty, a singular form of predation with an 
unequaled capacity for the subjection and exploitation of 
25
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for which slave owners were accountable.78  Yet, there are other 
failures of the law to account for bodies, failures that denied the 
body-as-such.  Some examples include prohibitions on sex 
between members of the same sex,79 international prohibitions 
on extramarital sex,80 and prohibitions on sex work.81 
It is, then, difficult to be in law, especially if one exhibits the 
bodily comportment82 or engages in the body practices that resist 
normative legal discourses.83  Of course, as many have 
 
foreign peoples” . . . .  Mbembe explores the structural drivers 
and consequences for this process but also its affective and 
psychological dimensions, the ways it constituted subjects 
the world over.  To be Black, he writes, was to become “the 
prototype of a poisoned, burnt subject” and “a being whose 
life is made of ashes.” 
 
Laurent Dubois, Introduction to ACHILLE MBEMBE, CRITIQUE OF BLACK REASON 
xi (Laurent Dubois trans., Duke Univ. Press Books 2017). 
78.  Kevin Bales, Slavery and the Human Right to Evil, 3 J. HUM. RTS. 53, 
58 (2004). 
79.  Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 51, 55–56 (1998) (suggesting that natural law may not support bans on 
same sex marriage); Sara Querbes, The Supreme Court, Sodomy Laws and the 
Impact of the LGBT Movement in America, TRANSCENDING SILENCE 
https://www.albany.edu/womensstudies/journal/2004/querbes.htm (2004) 
(describing the impact of sodomy laws on same-sex sexual intercourse). 
80.  Alyssa Miller, Punishing Passion: A Comparative Analysis of Adultery 
Laws in the United States of America and Taiwan and Their Effects on Women, 
41 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 425, 427–36 (2018). 
81.  Gail M. Deady, The Girl Next Door: A Comparative Approach to 
Prostitution Laws and Sex Trafficking Victim Identification Within the 
Prostitution Industry, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 515, 522–25 
(2011). 
82.  See generally David Allen Larson, Access to Justice for Persons with 
Disabilities: An Emerging Strategy, 3 LAWS 220 (2014) (centering access to 
justice as a need for improved training in law); Stephanie Ortoleva, 
Inaccessible Justice: Human Rights, Persons with Disabilities and the Legal 
System, 17 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 281 (2011) (discussing barriers to disabled 
persons’ access to law). 
83.  For lawyers, the matter of clothing seems one of the most restrictive 
sites of normative legal theory.  I remember working as a summer associate 
and learning from a supervising attorney that some judges in the courts of 
Virginia preferred women wear dresses and not pantsuits.  This wisdom was 
proffered in the mid-2000s, not 40 years ago.  See Lynda K. Hopewell, 
Appropriate Attire and Conduct for an Attorney in the Court Room, 12 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 177 (1987); Spencer Allen, The Unimaginably Silly Resistance to 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
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experienced, even if one is cisgendered and able-bodied, the 
complexity of laws, the difficulty one might have in finding them 
or understanding them, and their differential enforcement mean 
that being in law is always fraught with difficulty.  Law’s 
complexity can, in fact, make it difficult to be in law.84 
This is to argue that understanding law as the cure for what 
ails the body may be too optimistic when indeed pessimism is 
likely to be a preferable position.85  The problem is not that law 
cannot be helpful, empowering, or at the very least well-
intentioned, but rather that in order to assure law is at its best, 
scholars, students, and practitioners must be attuned to its 
limitations, problems, and inevitable failures.86  The sorts of 
euphoria that often result from “legal victories”87 often mean 
relatively little to the person suffering the micro-88 and macro-
 
Inseams in Women’s Clothing: The Battle for Pants in the Courtroom, BLOG 
POSTS: RICHMOND JOURNAL LAW & TECH. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://jolt.richmond 
.edu/2018/04/04/the-unimaginably-silly-resistance-to-inseams-in-womens-
clothing-the-battle-for-pants-in-the-courtroom/; Amanda Hess, Female 
Lawyers Who Dress Too “Sexy” Are Apparently a “Huge Problem” in the 
Courtroom, SLATE.COM (Mar. 21, 2014, 9:38 AM), https://slate.com/human-
interest/2014/03/female-lawyers-still-must-dress-conservatively-to-impress-
judges.html. 
84.   Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The 
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 403, 404, 406–14 (1997). 
85.  Yet, we know that pessimism might actually be helpful in the study 
and practice of law.  Emily Zimmerman & Casey LaDuke, Every Silver Lining 
Has a Cloud: Defensive Pessimism in Legal Education, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 823 
(2017); Debra Cassens Weiss, Pessimistic Law Students More Successful, 
Study Finds, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 9, 2007, 12:18 PM), http:// 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/pessimistic_lawyers_more_successful 
_study_finds/. 
86.  See generally Nick J. Sciullo, Zizek/Questions/Failing, 47 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 287 (2011) (describing failure’s centrality to law). 
87.  Ratna Kapur, There’s a Problem with the LGBT Rights Movement – 
It’s Limiting Freedom, CONVERSATION (Sept. 17, 2018, 5:25 AM), http://the 
conversation.com/theres-a-problem-with-the-lgbt-rights-movement-its-
limiting-freedom-101999. 
88.  Microaggressions “are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-
verbal exchanges which are ‘put downs’ of blacks by offenders.”  Chester M. 
Pierce et al., Introduction Television and Education to AN EXPERIMENT IN 
RACISM: TV COMMERCIALS, 10 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 3 (1977). See generally Peggy 
C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (describing law as 
a microaggression for Black persons because of pervasive bias); Kevin L. Nadal 
27
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aggressions89 of a violent world.  Rather than rest assured that 
change is good, or even happening, the more critical approach to 
legal thinking is one that is attuned to violence, drama, and 
inadequacy.  Instead of thinking about the way law protects the 
most vulnerable, one must focus on the way law does not do this 
in order to prevent a tendency to be too thankful, too subdued, 
or too forgetful of the everyday struggles of people.90 
Queer phenomenology is attuned to these struggles, 
recognizing the difficulties of everyday life.  It understands 
microaggressions and the way queer bodies are pushed and 
pulled into disorientation both by law and by individuals who 
simply fail to think about queer people91 or who actively accost 
them.92  Without the body, the ephemeral queer person lacks 
urgency.93  In the same ways that people often struggle with 
 
et al., Microaggressions Toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, 
and Genderqueer People: A Review of the Literature, 53 J. SEX RES. 488 (2016) 
(describing microaggressions against LGBTQ + persons); Daniel G. Solórzano, 
Critical Race Theory, Race and Gender, Microaggressions, and the Experience 
of Chicana and Chicano Scholars, 11 QUALITATIVE STUDS. EDUC. 121 (1998) 
(describing the experience of Latinx scholars with microaggressions); Derald 
Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions and the Asian American Experience, 
13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 72 (2007) (describing 
microaggressions against Asian Americans). 
89.  See generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME: 
RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND 
OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (2d ed., N.Y.U. Press 2008) (describing Black fear 
of law enforcement using macroaggression as a theory). 
90.  Brentin Mock, Are States Actually Protecting the Most Vulnerable 
with Their Justice Policies?, GRIST (Apr. 10, 2015), https://grist.org/politics/ 
are-states-actually-protecting-the-most-vulnerable-with-their-justice-
policies/; Julie Moreau, Federal Civil Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Transgender 
Workers, Justice Department Says, NBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/federal-civil-rights-law-doesn-t-
protect-transgender-workers-justice-n808126. 
91.  An increasingly popular way to refer to this notion of ignoring queer 
people or their oppression is queerblindness.  Alexandrea Martin, Challenging 
Corrections: Empowering LGBTQ Folx 43 (May 7, 2018) (unpublished Honors 
Thesis, University of Iowa). 
92.  John Bowden, Anti-LGBT Violence Surged in 2017, HILL (Jan. 23, 
2018, 9:36 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/370236-
report-anti-lgbt-violence-surged-in-2017. 
93.  Here, I am reminded of Adrienne Rich’s body politics and her belief 
that the body was a cite of contestation and power:  
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caring about international violence94 or human rights abuses95 
because they do not know the victims and cannot perceive the 
violence, so too is it easy to offer the palliative thought, well, 
things seem to be getting better for the LGBTQ+ community.96  
Regardless of how true that is, or even what it means with 
respect to access to healthcare, employment benefits, and safety, 
it eschews the responsibility we have for bodies in favor of grand 
narratives of progress.97  Such a practice can never fully account 
 
The moment when a feeling enters the body—is political.  
This touch is political.  By which I mean, that politics is the 
effort to find ways of humanely dealing with each other—as 
groups or as individuals—politics being simply process, the 
breaking down of barriers of oppression, tradition, culture, 
ignorance, fear, self-protectiveness. 
 
ADRIENNE RICH, WHAT IS FOUND THERE: NOTEBOOKS ON POETRY AND POLITICS 
24 (1993); see Jacek Kornak, Queer as a Political Concept 1–15 (Feb. 4, 2015) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Helsinki) (on file with author). 
94.  Gil Laroya, Why Don’t People Care When It Doesn’t Affect Them?, 
HUFFPOST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gil-laroya/why-
dont-people-care-when_b_5888686.html. 
95.  See generally Doug Bandow, The Price of Ignoring Human Rights: 
Lost Credibility, Brutal Allies and New Enemies, FORBES (June 19, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/06/19/the-price-of-igno 
ring-human-rights-lost-credibility-brutal-allies-and-new-
enemies/#4252ff30629e; David Ropeik, Statistical Numbing: Why Millions Can 
Die and We Don’t Care, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: HOW RISKY IS IT, REALLY? (Aug. 
15, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/how-risky-is-it-
really/201108/statistical-numbing-why-millions-can-die-and-we-don-t-care; 
Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human 




96.  That is, things are not nearly as good or getting better as quickly as 
one might believe.  See generally Reynaldo Leanos, Jr., When It Comes to 
School Safety for LGBTQ Kids, Progress Has Slowed, Survey Finds, NBC NEWS 
(Oct. 19, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/ when-it-
comes-school-safety-lgbtq-kids-progress-has-slowed-n922126; Julie Moreau, 
Global LGBTQ Acceptance More Polarized, New Research Finds, NBC NEWS 
(May 3, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/global-
lgbtq-acceptance-more-polarized-new-research-finds-n871106. 
97.  Robin Linde & Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur, Teaching Progress: A 
Critique of the Grand Narrative of Human Rights as Pedagogy for 
Marginalized Students, 103 RADICAL TCHR. 26, 28, 33–34 (2015). 
29
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for the body. 
 
Hammering at Law 
 
In our daily lives we need to follow Ahmed’s “affinity of 
hammers,” that embraces the ways we can chip away at 
oppressive systems and practices.98  An affinity of hammers is 
Ahmed’s insistence on the importance of the little work we do 
every day that may not seem significant or may easily be cast 
aside by those more interested in mergers and acquisitions.  
These actions do not always highlight a clear path to success.  It 
may not seem like much just as it is difficult to envision oneself 
a lawyer or writing one’s first law review article.  One may not 
envision a shift to social democracy or radical equality in the 
style of Ernesto Laclau or Chantal Mouffe99 from every time they 
refuse the socially condoned laughter at a racist joke or when 
they refuse to read the 100th sexist tweet from one’s family 
member, but it is these hammerings that, when taken 
collectively, reshape the world.  These hammerings create more 
than they deconstruct.  They allow us to feel collective pride in 
the little things. 
What is most interesting and perhaps least explored is this 
idea of an affinity of and not an affinity for hammers.  Again, 
Ahmed has us playing with orientation.  An affinity for hammers 
would mean we like hammers, but not necessarily appreciate 
what they do.  An affinity of hammers expresses a relationship 
to the hammers.  Of means the affinity is constructed of what 
hammers do,100 namely chip away at the oppressive systems that 
make many of our lives atrocious.  This rhetorical move is very 
much central to her politics.  If we orient ourselves toward the 
work hammers do and not to the hammers themselves, then we 
 
98.  Ahmed, supra note 69, at 33. 
99.  See generally ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND 
SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (Winston 
Moore & Paul Cammack trans., Verso 2d ed. 2001) (1985) (focusing on 
hegemony as an analytical tool in analyzing oppression and social action). 
100.  That is, the affinity is constituted of hammers.  Of means the 
substance constituting something, so then the affinity is constituted of 
hammers, expressing the centrality of hammers and all that they do to 
Ahmed’s praxis. 
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center the work bodies can do. 
Ahmed’s centering of hammering answers the exclusionary 
politics of trans-exclusionary radical feminists101 by arguing that 
we are all at once hammering away at the system when we 
recognize the centrality of trans politics to the world.  We need 
the collective struggles of anti-fascist, anti-racist, anti-capitalist, 
and other movements if we are going to make progress in the 
world.  Sometimes it is the hammering rather than the ideology 
that we need to focus on in order to form meaningful coalitions.  
As such, Ahmed has often been described as an anti-ideological 
thinker because she is intimately concerned with the material 
effects of her theories.102  Yet, one need not focus on material 
concerns at the expense of ideology.  In this light, Ahmed 
provides legal scholars with the theory needed to come together 
despite ideological differences.103 
So, while lawyers may disagree about politics or theories of 
government, they can come together about better transportation 
funding because it will improve the community by making travel 
safer, making it easier to go to work, and encouraging businesses 
to locate in a location.  For Ahmed, the same is true in queer 
 
101.  Cursed E, 10 TERF ‘Arguments’ That Need to Stop, MEDIUM (Feb. 5, 
2018), https://medium.com/@notCursedE/10-terf-arguments-that-need-to-
stop-80e34d07dae4; Kelsie Brynn Jones, Trans-Exclusionary Radical 
Feminism: What Exactly Is it, and Why Does it Hurt?, HUFFPOST (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kelsie-brynn-jones/transexclusionary-radical-
terf_b_5632332.html; Cristan Williams, You Might Be a TERF If. . ., TRANS 
ADVOCATE (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.transadvocate.com/you-might-be-a-
terf-if_n_10226.htm.  But see Sarah Ditum, What Is a Terf? How an Internet 
Buzzword Became a Mainstream Slur, NEW STATESMAN AM. (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/feminism/2017/09/what-terf-how-
internet-buzzword-became-mainstream-slur (arguing that “TERF” is a slur); 
Meghan Murphy, ‘TERF’ Isn’t Just a Slur, It’s Hate Speech, FEMINIST CURRENT 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.feministcurrent.com/2017/09/21/terf-isnt-slur-
hate-speech/ (using a traditional liberal feminist paradigm to accuse people 
who use the acronym “TERF” of hate speech). 
102.  See generally Cari Hovanec, A Critique of Affect Theory, CARI 
HOVANEC (Mar. 31, 2018), http://www.carihovanec.com/blog/a-critique-of-
affect-theory/ (making an oblique critique of Ahmed’s work). 
103.  Nishta J. Mehra, Sara Ahmed: Notes from a Feminist Killjoy, 
GUERNICA (July 17, 2017), https://www.guernicamag.com/sara-ahmed-the-
personal-is-institutional/ (describing how her work bridges divides and 
requires revision). 
31
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politics.104  This group, the trans-exclusionary radical feminists 
(TERFs),105 is a real issue because instead of having an affinity 
of hammers, their members have an affinity for narrow-minded, 
anti-progressive, patriarchal backsliding.106  Because the TERFs 
are part of the system against which the hammering is done, 
they represent not a challenge to politics as usual to the 
patriarchy and hierarchical, gendered thinking, but rather the 
sort of politics against which queer politics positions itself.  They 
focus on a monolithic understanding of feminism that serves the 
patriarchal and heteronormative system that disadvantages 
them.  There are always those that may in some ways be broadly 
helpful to a cause (feminism), but hurtful to specific causes 
(transgender rights).  However, if we follow Ahmed by focusing 
on the action—the hammering—then whatever disagreements 
we have about identity might seem a little less important, as 
hammering empowers and emboldens individuals to have better 
daily experiences. 
Queer phenomenology leads Ahmed in this direction, of 
course.  If we center the body, the material reality of being queer, 
or even the materiality of being Black, disabled, or tall, we would 
be better able to advocate together for improved material 
conditions because the body would be our focus. 
A queer phenomenology harnesses the tremendous diversity 
of lived experiences of queer folks and can be an affinity of 
hammers, an appreciation for collective work that does not 
always seem meaningful, but when lifted up, raised up, its 
 
104.  SARA AHMED, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EMOTION 165 (2d ed. 2014) 
(stating “[t]he hope of queer politics is that bringing us closer to others, from 
whom we have been barred, might also bring us to different ways of living with 
others”). 
105.  Jones, supra note 101; see also Michelle Goldberg, What Is A 
Woman?, NEW YORKER: AM. CHRONICLES (July 28, 2014), https://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2; Danelle Wylder & Corrie Westing, 
TERFs Have No Place on The Left, SOCIALIST WORKER (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://socialistworker.org/2018/08/21/terfs-have-no-place-on-the-left. 
106.  A good example of this is a well-debated article where someone 
espousing TERF beliefs insists that they are not a TERF in a popular feminist 
space, Feminist Current.  Penny White, Why I No Longer Hate ‘TERFs,’ 
FEMINIST CURRENT (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.feministcurrent 
.com/2015/11/10/why-i-no-longer-hate-terfs/.  The explanation of why this 
article is in fact exclusionary is evident in the comments section which features 
multiple criticisms of the article.  Id. 
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combined force can chip away at the pathological tropes of a 
damaged country. 
There is a tendency to think about law in a monumental 
historical sense—Lawrence v. Texas107 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges,108 or even Stonewall109 and Caitlyn Jenner.110  In the 
context of queer rights, specifically transgender rights, this has 
negative consequences.111  G.G. v. Gloucester County School 
Board,112 as styled by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
represents precisely the danger of relying too much on a single 
event, plaintiff, or idea because this case, set to be the first case 
on transgender rights heard by the United States Supreme 
Court, was remanded to the Fourth Circuit with a one-sentence 
order vacating the judgment.113  Gavin Grimm (G.G.) proceeded 
 
107.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
108.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).   
109.  Jarrett Earnest, Does NYC’s ‘Gay Liberation’ Monument Whitewash 
Stonewall? The New Museum Proposes Replacements., VULTURE (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://www.vulture.com/2018/11/is-nycs-gay-liberation-monument-too-
white.html (discussing the ways in which “Gay Liberation,” the monument to 
the Stonewall riots, might whitewash history); Garance Franke-Ruta, An 
Amazing 1969 Account of the Stonewall Uprising, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/an-ama zing-1969-
account-of-the-stonewall-uprising/272467/ (expressing the drawbacks of 
putting too much faith in Stonewall). 
110.  See generally Joey DiGuglielmo, Caitlyn Jenner: American Hero or 
‘Arrogant’ Dilettante?, WASH. BLADE (Aug. 19, 2015, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/08/19/caitlyn-jenner-american-hero-
or-arrogant-dilettante/ (arguing that Caitlyn Jenner represents a problematic 
transgender rights advocate at best); Marco Margaritoff, Caitlyn Jenner on 
Backlash from LGBTQ Community: ‘I Get the Criticism That I Don’t Get It,’ 
COMPLEX (May 22, 2018), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2018/05/ 
caitlyn-jenner-backlash-lgbtq-community (discussing backlash against 
Caitlyn Jenner for her problematic political views and public statements). 
111.  See generally Samantha Allen, Gavin Grimm Is Transgender: His 
Legal Fight to Go to the Bathroom Is Endless, DAILY BEAST (May 24, 2018, 3:55 
PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/gavin-grimm-is-transgender-his-legal-
fight-to-go-to-the-bathroom-is-endless (describing the lengthy and complex 
legal maneuvering of transgender rights in G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), as producing strain, confusion, frustration, and 
other related emotions). 
112. 822 F.3d 709. 
113. Caitlin Emma, High Court Sidesteps Ruling on Transgender Rights, 
POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://www.politico.com/story 
/2017/03/supreme-court-scraps-transgender-bathroom-rights-235712. 
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to graduate high school without ever resolving the legal issue his 
case presented.114  Thus, those who eagerly tracked this case 
were left with tremendous disappointment that the Supreme 
Court failed to act on the important and divisive issue of 
transgender rights.115  The impact of such inaction is not an 
ephemeral understanding of fundamental rights, but rather the 
physical danger posed to transgender persons who are denied 
legal rights.116  That is, the denial should be understood 
phenomenologically as a denial of the threat to one’s life, as 
another attempt to end queer experience. 
This monumental reading of history was dispelled by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and his critique remains relevant.117  There 
are several problems with monumental approaches to history or 
to narrative.  The first is that it often ignores many of the 
important people and actions that made an event possible.  For 
example, one might discuss slave revolts118 with reference to 
 
114. G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, ACLU (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-county-school-board. 
115. Elliott Kozuch, BREAKING: U.S. Supreme Court Remands and 




117. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF 
HISTORY FOR LIFE 14–23 (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1874). 
118. See generally Brian Gabrial, From Haiti to Nat Turner: Racial Panic 
Discourse During the Nineteenth Century Partisan Press Era, 30 AM. 
JOURNALISM 336 (2013) (discussing press coverage and racial panic discourse 
surrounding slave revolts); see also JOHANNES POSTMA, SLAVE REVOLTS (2008) 
(discussing slave revolts in encyclopedic fashion). 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4
ARTICLE 4_SCIULLO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:33 PM 
2019 QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY IN LAW 701 
Gabriel Prosser,119 Denmark Vesey,120 and Nat Turner,121 but 
ignore Boston King.122  This flattens history and reduces our 
interest in the complex narratives that shape social change.  The 
argument is not that we should reject discussing people and 
events, but rather that we must tell a complete story.  Telling 
the story of queer people as a string of discrete events misses the 
important everyday instances of queer politics.  It is also 
common to romantically remember these monuments as better 
or more successful than they were.  For example, one might 
remember the team that won the World Series, even though that 
team had worse statistics, won less games, and had less all-stars 
than another year’s edition of that team or even another team 
that year. 
However, that sort of understanding fails to capture the 
hammering work that led to change.  It is synchronic, failing to 
understand the long, multifaceted history of our historical 
monuments.  What we need is not the Badiouian evental 
 
119. See generally DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL’S REBELLION: THE 
VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 1800 AND 1802 (1993); MICHAEL L. NICHOLLS, 
WHISPERS OF REBELLION: NARRATING GABRIEL’S CONSPIRACY (2013); Douglas R. 
Egerton, Gabriel’s Conspiracy and the Election of 1800, 56 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 
191 (1990) (describing the impact Versey’s rebellion had ideologically and 
politically). 
120.  See generally ETHAN J. KYTLE & BLAIN ROBERTS, DENMARK VESEY’S 
GARDEN: SLAVERY AND MEMORY IN THE CRADLE OF THE CONFEDERACY (2018); 
JOHN LOFTON, DENMARK VESEY’S REVOLT: THE SLAVE PLOT THAT LIT A FUSE TO 
FORT SUMTER (John David Smith ed., Kent State Univ. Press 2013) (1983); 
DAVID ROBERTSON, DENMARK VESEY: THE BURIED STORY OF AMERICA’S LARGEST 
SLAVE REBELLION AND THE MAN WHO LED IT (2000). 
121.  See generally PATRICK H. BREEN, THE LAND SHALL BE DELUGED IN 
BLOOD: A NEW HISTORY OF THE NAT TURNER REVOLT (2016); STEPHEN B. OATES, 
THE FIRES OF JUBILEE: NAT TURNER’S FIERCE REBELLION (2014); NAT TURNER: A 
SLAVE REBELLION IN HISTORY AND MEMORY (Kenneth Greenberg ed. 2004) 
(discussing the broad significance of Nat Turner in his time through today’s 
popular culture); Philip J. Schwarz, Gabriel’s Challenge: Slaves and Crime in 
Late Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 90 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 283 (1982). 
122.  Boston King, Memoirs of the Life of Boston King, A Black Preacher, 
METHODIST MAG., Mar.–June 1798, at 105; see also Adam Christian Smith, 
Boston King (c. 1760-1802), BLACKPAST (Sept. 22, 2010),  https://blackpast.org/ 
gah/boston-king-c-1760-1802; James W. St. G. Walker, King, Boston, 
DICTIONARY CANADIAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio.php?id_nbr 
=2489 (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
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politics123 which, while helpful in assessing the significance of 
discrete events, still has a tendency to deny the contextual 
longue durée of evental politics.  One need not do away with the 
Event to resist the Event as historical lens.  Reading the Event 
and monumental history as similar will no doubt cause Badiou 
and Nietzsche scholars to bristle, but the idea here is not to over-
determine the present.124  Indeed, it denies the work of 
 
123.  Andrew Robinson summarizes Badiou’s theory of the Event:  
 
An Event is something akin to a rip in the fabric of being, 
and/or of the social order.  It is traumatic for the mainstream, 
and exhilaratingly transformative for participants. Events 
are so radical as to even escape Badiou’s own ontology.  A lot 
of Badiou’s discussions of the Event are negative.  An Event 
is depicted as being other than “being as being”, or the 
normal, mathematically integrated structure of reality. Since 
there is no general situation or History, something only has 
‘being’ if it belongs to a situation.  Events do not belong to 
situations, events occur outside being-as-being.  This means 
that set theory and the resultant ontology cannot 
conceptualise Events. 
 
Andrew Robinson, Alain Badiou: The Event, CEASEFIRE: AN A TO Z OF THEORY 
(Dec. 15, 2014, 11:13 PM), https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/alain-badiou-event/.  
Robinson’s description gives conceptual clarity to Alain Badiou’s description: 
“A truth is solely constituted by rupturing with the order which supports it, 
never as an effect of that order.  I have named this type of rupture which opens 
up truths ‘the event.’”  ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT xii (Oliver Feltham 
trans., 2007) (1988). 
124.  Although Badiou contrasts these two concepts, the fetishization of 
the Event pushes it toward its monumental specter.  ALAIN BADIOU, 
METAPOLITICS 97 (Jason Barker trans., Verso 2005) (1998).  Yet, David Wild 
writes in a way suggesting the two ideas are more similar than even Wild lets 
on:  
 
Thus, Badiou’s first move is to divide history: on the one 
hand, there is the monumental history of the state (of the 
victors); on the other, there are the rare, often brief, instances 
of politics that are connected to the truth of the collective . . . 
.  While all political sequences are necessarily “singular”, in 
as much as they trace no destiny (there is no determinism in 
the aleatory trajectory of a political event), the task of 
philosophy is to extract the “infinite” aspects of political 
sequences from the relativizing effects of “statist” history. 
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hammering.125  In this sense then, it is important not to stop 
hammering, not to lay down one’s hammer. 
One will always be dissatisfied if one only measures 
progress by Supreme Court decisions.126  The legal system is 
built that way, to be slow and theoretically well-reasoned.  It is 
 
David Wild, Alain Badiou’s Politics and the Problem of Social History, 10 
CRITICAL HORIZONS: J. PHIL. 391, 397 (2009). 
125.  Sara Ahmed describes the complexity of hammering and the need to 
constantly practice and refine hammering: 
 
Stones might be willing; or not.  At one level, stones 
appear as willful, insofar as willfulness is often related to 
being obstinate and unyielding.  But of course its hardness, 
its tendencies, allows us to do certain things.  We might 
assume the stone as a willing participant if we use the stone 
as a hammer: our hammering might depend on the stone; our 
will might be distributed across a field of action that includes 
the stone.  But we should not find agency only in agreement.  
That is an-all-too human tendency that I have been grappling 
with throughout this book: to assume “yes” as a sign of being 
willing, a sign that is taken up as the giving of permission to 
proceed. This is one way we tend to go wrong.  It is not that 
from the point of view of the hammer, everything is nail, but 
that the hammer is already a human point of view.  The 
hammer is stone given the form of human intention.  Perhaps 
stones are willing inasmuch as what they do not let us do; in 
how they resist our intentions.  They can be checking powers; 
reminders that the world is not waiting to receive our shape.  
Perhaps then, they grab our attention.  We might need to lose 
the hammer to find the stone. 
 
Sara Ahmed, Willful Stones, FEMINISTKILLJOYS (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://feministkilljoys.com/2016/01/29/willful-stones/. 
126.  See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Ideological Preferences and Hollow Hopes: 
Responding to Criticism, UNIV. CHI. PRESS, https://www.press.uchicago 
.edu/books/rosenberg/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2019); see also Douglas 
NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 877, 901 (2013).  See generally Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of 
Law and Social Change: What Is the Field? What Are the Questions?, 2013 
WISC. L. REV. 171 (2013) (providing a framework for analysis of the courts’ 
ability to address and affect social change). But see Adam Deming, Comment: 
Backlash Blunders: Obergefell and the Efficacy of Litigation to Achieve Social 
Change, 19 J. CONST. L. 271 (2016) (arguing that backlash to Supreme Court 
decisions is possible, but that the Obergefell decision was not subject to 
significant backlash). 
37
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plodding, it makes gradual changes, and it moves at “all 
deliberate speed.”127  This deliberate system makes the legal 
system predictable and allows people to reasonably assess the 
likelihood they will prevail in a case,128 but it does not 
necessarily assure that rights are distributed evenly and 
defended vigorously.129  That is why the real work of law is at 
the body.  Our bodies grow weary as we wait for law, as if law 
had a cape and a utility belt.130  So rather than waiting, Ahmed 
 
127.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see DERRICK BELL, 
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 112 (1987). 
128.  Jeremy Waldron makes this argument in the context of stare decisis: 
 
There is a cluster of considerations commonly cited in 
support of the system of precedent that seems to invoke rule-
of-law values.  These include the importance of certainty, 
predictability, and respect for established expectations.  By 
commanding that judges follow previous decisions, stare 
decisis is supposed to make it easier for people facing a new 
situation to predict how the courts will deal with it: they will 
deal with it in the way that they have dealt with similar 
situations in the past, rather than striking out unpredictably 
with a new approach of their own. 
 
Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012). 
129.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Problem with Predictability, AM. 
PROSPECT (July 7, 2005), https://prospect.org/article/problem-predictability 
(describing how predictability in law and a justice’s rulings does not 
necessarily produce the best decisions). 
130.  This is a reference to the DC Comics character Batman who wears 
a cape and a utility belt where he stores various gadgets to fight evil.  The idea 
of “waiting for Batman” has come to represent the idea of waiting for a 
superhero to come along and right wrongs or solve problems, often 
characterizing the people waiting as hopeful, idealistic, and perhaps out of 
touch with political and social realities.  See JAMES KAKALIOS, THE PHYSICS OF 
THE SUPERHEROES 159 (2005) (describing Batman’s utility belt, and other 
attributes of comic book heroes, as a way to discuss topics in physics).  See 
generally Spencer Ackerman, Batman Confronts Police Racism in Latest Comic 
Book, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2015, 10:31 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/books/2015/sep/15/batman-confronts-police-brutality-in-latest-comic-
book (discussing Batman as a politico-legal commentary on police violence); 
Matt Sturtevant, Waiting for Batman, FIRST BAPTIST LAWRENCE (June 4, 2017), 
https://firstbaptistlawrence.com/waiting-for-batman/ (using “waiting for 
Batman” as a message to encourage salvation and reconceptualizing one’s 
relationship with self and Christianity); Patrik Walker, Rookie CB Duke 
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would have us pick up our hammers. 
It is hammering every day to make a less exclusionary, less 
transphobic, less homophobic world that appreciates the 
intrinsic value of the body.  Until we do that, and slavery proves 
this in its disregard for the Black body, we will struggle because 
absent an appreciation for the body, what it does, does not do, 
and what it enables and prevents, then a meaningful queer 




What I have argued is that we must come back to the body 
as a site of law.  From the prison bed to health care laws, we 
experience law bodily.  A critical theory of orientation asks us to 
focus on the body and the ways in which it interacts with law 
such that when we engage in its prepositional logic we 
understand exactly what that means about our relationship to 
it.  Law without the body comes dangerously close to the erasure 
of bodies in monarchical politics highlighted by Ernst 
Kantorowicz’s 1997 book, The King’s Two Bodies.131  
Kantorowicz troubled over the ways in which monarchs 
fabulated a body that existed beyond death.132  This political 
 
Thomas a Dark Horse to Make Cowboys’ Final Roster, 247SPORTS (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://247sports.com/nfl/dallas-cowboys/Bolt/Rookie-CB-Duke-Thomas 
-a-dark-horse-to-make-Dallas-Cowboys-final-roster-106358501/ (describing 
“waiting for Batman” as a sort of hopelessness felt for, and called by, a veteran 
athlete hoping to take a more prominent role in the upcoming season).  
131.  ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1997). 
132.  Perhaps most revealing of the grammar of Kantorowicz’s theory, 
Alain Boureau summarizes it as such: 
 
This organized grammar took on a more specific, more 
‘Western’ aspect in Ernst Kantorowicz’s version.  For him, 
political transcendence constituted a true discourse in 
Western Europe, which gave birth to an idea of statehood 
that has scarcely any cultural equivalent.  To fully grasp this 
trend, it is necessary to start from the central principle 
underlying the concept of The King’s Two Bodies: ‘dignitas 
non moritur’ [dignity does not die].  This formula undeniably 
contains an element of the metaphorical, with a literal term 
(dignity, function) and a figurative term (represented by the 
39
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arrangement denied the body so much so that an absent body 
began to control the physical body of others in the Middle Ages.  
It is concerning that if we ignore the body we will have a political 
structure built on the body’s absence,133 which may be an 
accurate description of our current political system.  The body’s 
absence brings to mind Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection.134  
For Kristeva, abjection was the state of being utterly annihilated 
in a sort of noncorporeal position.135  One might think of the body 
 
verb to die).  Bearing in mind that the metaphorical process 
basically turns on the predicate, what we have here is a well-
worn metaphor: in the fourteenth century Lucas of Penna 
glossed ‘does not die’ as ‘lasts forever’ [quod semper est].  The 
statement seems commonplace, extending to the secular 
institution a principle established in the domain of religion: 
the Church, the Apostolic See, does not die.  Hence, 
institutional history indicates a displacement, a shift. 
Kantorowicz’s brilliant idea was to reveal a new metaphor by 
placing the emphasis on the subject and not on the predicate. 
If dignity does not die, that is because it is compared to a 
living being, a person.  The predicate non moritur thus 
creates a paradigm of living, immortal subjects that combines 
institutions (dead metaphors), divine subjects (theological 
predications) and mythological beings (allegories) or fictional 
ones (living metaphors): Empire, Mystical Body, Angel, 
Christ, Treasury, King, Phoenix. 
 
Alain Boureau, How Christian Was the Sacralization of Monarchy in Western 
Europe (Twelfth-Fifteenth Centuries)?, in MYSTIFYING THE MONARCH: STUDIES 
ON DISCOURSE, POWER, AND HISTORY 25, 27 (Jeroen Deploige & Gita Deneckere 
eds., 2006) (citation omitted). 
133.  See generally DREW LEDER, THE ABSENT BODY (1990) (discussing the 
absence of the body in political discourse and arguing for a phenomenological 
rejoinder). 
134.  See generally JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON 
ABJECTION (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1982) (1980) 
(discussing Kristeva’s theory of abjection). 
135.  Kristeva describes the abject in this way:  
 
When I am beset by abjection, the twisted braid of affects 
and thoughts I call by such a name does not have, properly 
speaking, a definable object.  The abject is not an ob-ject 
facing me, which I name or imagine.  Nor is it an ob-jest, an 
otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire.  
What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with 
someone or something else as support, would allow me to be 
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of the slave that was denied; for rather than accept slaves as 
corporeal entities, the United States understood slaves as 
objects, not subjects.136  This made sense in the perverse logic of 
capitalist white supremacy137 because it was far easier to dispose 
of objects than bodies.  Bodies are messy—they sweat, demand 
care, leak, break, secrete, defecate, and rot.138  Who would want 
 
more or less detached and autonomous.  The abject has only 
one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I.  If the 
object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the 
fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of 
fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, 
what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is 
radically excluded and draws me toward the place where 
meaning collapses.  A certain “ego” that merged with its 
master, a superego, has flatly driven it away.  It lies outside, 
beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules 
of the game.  And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject 
does not cease challenging its master. 
 
Id. at 1–2. 
136.  The slave’s existence as object was foundational to the United States’ 
slave system, enabling the entire enterprise: 
  
The slave is objectified in such a way that they are legally 
made an object (a commodity) to be used and exchanged. It is 
not just their labor-power that is commodified—as with the 
worker—but their very being. As such, they are not 
recognized as a social subject and are thus precluded from the 
category of “human”—inclusion in humanity being 
predicated on social recognition, volition, subjecthood, and 
the valuation of life. 
 
Editors’ Introduction to AFRO-PESSIMISM: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (Racked & 
Dispatched, eds., 2017); SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, 
SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 62 (1997) (“The 
slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the existence of the 
bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, 
citizenship, and the enclosures of the social body.”); Lynn Stewart, Louisiana 
Subjects: Power, Space and the Slave Body, 2 ECUMENE 227, 227 (1995) (“The 
slave body was crucial to slave-owners as a unit of labour, a vector of disease, 
an object of desire, and, always, as a locus of potentially violent resistance.”).  
See generally PAGE DUBOIS, SLAVES AND OTHER OBJECTS (2003) (discussing the 
slave as object in Ancient Greece). 
137.  Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 
1714 (1993). 
138.  See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, LIBIDINAL ECONOMY 1–3 (1993); Anke 
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to deal with them?  The object, thus, has no body. 
A queer phenomenology takes this on directly and with the 
verve necessary to establish the centrality of queer bodies in law.  
Queer bodies are even messier,139 but not in the transphobic and 
homophobic ways that various segments of the population 
demonize queer sexual relations and other interactions.140  
Aimee Carrillo Rowe and Francesca T. Royster describe 
queerness as “the messy affects of political living,” which resist 
normative scripts of appropriate appearance, action, sexuality, 
gender, and political engagement.141  Queer phenomenology 
appreciates the messiness of bodies. 
Messiness is a condition of possibility.142  Queering space 
means resisting the formal language of bodies.  It is a ruthless 
reclaiming of the power of bodies to articulate identities.  The 
way to rescue the queer body’s push toward non-being, toward 
abjection, is to become that much more concerned with the body 
 
Bernau, Bodies of Knowledge, 25 FLORILEGIUM 75, 79–82 (2008); Imogen Tyler, 
Against Abjection, 10 FEMINIST THEORY 77, 79–80 (2009) (“Kristeva theorises 
abjection in distinctly phenomenological terms, associating the abject with all 
that is repulsive and fascinating about bodies and, in particular, those aspects 
of bodily experience which unsettle singular bodily integrity: death, decay, 
fluids, orifices, sex, defecation, vomiting, illness, menstruation, pregnancy and 
childbirth”). 
139.  Deborah R. Vargas, Ruminations on Lo Sucio as a Latino Queer 
Analytic, 66 AM. Q. 715, 718, 724 (2014). 
140.  Martin F. Manalansan IV, The Messy Itineraries of Queerness, SOC. 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, (July 21, 2015), https://culanth.org/fieldsights/the-
messy-itineraries-of-queerness. 
141.  Aimee Carrillo Rowe & Francesca T. Royster, Loving 
Transgressions: Queer of Color Bodies, Affective Ties, Transformative 
Community, 21 J. LESBIAN STUDS. 243, 245 (2016). 
142.  Martin F. Manalansan IV describes the messiness of queer bodies 
this way: 
 
Queer as mess refers to material and affective conditions 
of impossible subjects as well as an analytical stance that 
negates, deflects, if not resists the “cleaning up” function of 
the normative.  Queerness, then, is not just about off-kilter 
sex or nonnormative desires, but is about the potentials and 
possibilities behind quotidian practices and struggles of 
peripheral lives. 
 
Manalansan, supra note 140. 
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and exhibit the necessary ethic of care143 to accept and advocate 
for queer bodies.  Queer phenomenology should be messy 
because only in the messiness of ontological appreciation will 
queer people be able to exist in law. 




143.  Rather than the essentialist notion promoted by Carol Gilligan, I 
take to heart Malan & Cilliers reframing of Gilligan’s ethic of care as 
“concerned with humane, non-violative relationships between human beings.” 
Yvonne Malan & Paul Cilliers, Gilligan and Complexity: Reinterpreting the 
“Ethic of Care”, 36 ACTA ACADEMIA, no. 3, 2004, at 1, 17.  This in turn means 
“that considering the relationships between people and the context in which 
they find themselves are as important as the abstract rights and principles at 
stake.” Id. at 16.  That is, a phenomenological theory of queerness values 
people in time and space as opposed to abstraction and universalism. 
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